



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11 November 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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5. USSR: Comment on truck-mounted missile displayed in 7 November Moscow parade. (Page iii)
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

11 November 1961

## DAILY BRIEF

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USSR-Berlin: Foreign Minister Gromyko used his informal conversations with the American, British, and West German ambassadors at a 7 November reception to underscore the USSR's readiness for four-power negotiations on a Berlin settlement. Now that Adenauer has been installed as chancellor in West Germany and the 22nd party congress has ended, Moscow apparently intends to step up the pace of its diplomatic moves in an effort to induce the West to agree to early negotiations. According to Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador Smirnov has instructions to meet with Chancellor Adenauer, apparently to resume their mid-August discussion on Berlin. Khrushchev received the West German ambassador on 9 November, and Yuriy Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee on Foreign Cultural Relations, urged Ambassador Thompson to make arrangements to see Khrushchev.

On the substance of the Berlin and German questions, Gromyko made no mention of a peace treaty and confirmed that the negotiations could be limited to the problems of access to and the status of West Berlin. While insisting on demilitarization of West Berlin and termination of the occupation status, Gromyko stated that the USSR was prepared to provide the "most formal guarantees" that East Germany would respect an agreement. He was adamant in rejecting any formal link between Bonn and Berlin, but did indicate that present financial and economic ties could be maintained.

(Backup, Page 1)

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\*USSR-Finland: Soviet officials have reportedly assured Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen, who begins his conversations with Foreign Minister Gromyko on 11 November, that the USSR was not proposing to seek bases in Finland.

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[redacted] In conversations with several Western ambassadors at a Kremlin reception on 7 November, Gromyko said he did not see the reason for "all the excitement," since the Soviet Union had merely asked for consultations with a neighbor. He took this same line with the Finnish ambassador. Finnish officials have emphasized privately that Karjalainen will not negotiate or sign anything in Moscow but only "talk about talking later" with the Soviets. The deputy director for political affairs in the Finnish Foreign Ministry said that only after Karjalainen reported back to Helsinki would a decision be made on whether to begin formal consultations. [redacted]

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USSR: [The truck-mounted 35- to 40-foot-long cylinder containing a missile, which was displayed publicly for the first time in the 7 November Moscow parade, generally resembles a cylinder mounted on the main deck of a W-class long-range submarine which was photographed in a shipyard near Murmansk in August. The similarity tends to confirm the impression that the cylinder mounted on the submarine is a missile launcher and suggests further that the USSR has developed a mobile short-range missile system intended for use by both ground and naval forces.]


[Two other W-class submarines in the same yard had sections removed from the deck in the same location as the cylinder]

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25X1 [ ] mounting, suggesting that similar installations were in progress. Initial reports suggest that the cylinder on the submarine is somewhat smaller than the one in the parade, but this is subject to confirmation by detailed photo interpretation.

25X1 [ ] The approximately 210 W-class units constitute the bulk of the Soviet submarine force, and the conversion of a number of these units would be consistent with the increased emphasis Moscow has placed on submarine missile systems in the last several years. [ ]

25X1 Laos: Peiping has given a blunt warning that large-scale hostilities may be resumed in Laos. According to a 9 November broadcast from Peiping, the Geneva talks have reached a point where "no more negotiations are possible." The choice now, according to the broadcast, is a coalition government or "the outbreak of war." During the past two weeks, the Soviet representative at Geneva has indicated concern over the danger of a "renewed outbreak of military action" in Laos and has repeatedly urged that a coalition government be rapidly formed.

25X1 [ ] \*In Laos itself, no progress has been made toward a political settlement since 18 October, when Souvanna Phouma received King Savang's approval to attempt to form a government. Souvanna has issued a new call for tripartite talks to be held in the Plaine des Jarres on 17 November. He has given some indication, however, that if the Boun Oum government persists in its opposition to this site, he may be willing to meet again in Hin Heup, the neutralized site north of Vientiane where agreement on Souvanna as premier was reached by the three princes early last month. [ ]

25X1 [ ] (Backup, Page 3) (Map)

25X1 [ ] France-Algeria: The provisional Algerian government (PAG) is reportedly "deeply impressed" by De Gaulle's recent [ ]

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25X1 [ ] public statements that the PAG has on its side the sentiments of the majority of the Algerian population. Ambassador Walmsley in Tunis feels that this French admission has removed a major obstacle to successful negotiations. The PAG has been extremely sensitive to past French allegations that it did not represent the majority of Algerians.

The US Embassy in Paris points out that European settlers and the Secret Army Organization (OAS) will derive little comfort from the vague references to "guarantees and rights" in De Gaulle's speeches. The peaceful demonstrations scheduled by the OAS for this week end may provide the occasion for outbreaks of violence. [ ]  
(Backup, Page 5)

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25X1 [ ] Afghanistan-Pakistan-USSR: Kabul has reportedly received a Soviet offer to airlift food and other supplies for the stranded Pushtoon nomads, who are being prevented by Pakistani authorities from migrating to their traditional winter quarters on the Pakistani plains. The Afghan Government may accept the offer, since it is worried about its ability to support the nomads through the winter.

[ ] Although there have been no first-hand reports on the movements of the 250,000 nomads since the initial group of 7,000 was turned back at the border in mid-October, additional caravans presumably have been gathering along the frontier. [ ]

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### Soviet Officials Comment on Berlin and Party Congress

Soviet officials are seeking to persuade Western representatives that developments at the party congress should be interpreted as a favorable sign for Western interests, particularly in regard to Berlin. Yuriy Zhukov, who often claims to have Khrushchev's confidence in matters of foreign affairs, told Ambassador Thompson that he hoped President Kennedy was aware of the significance of the party congress as a victory for Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence. Earlier, on 25 October, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official claimed that the "anti-party" group had opposed efforts to improve Soviet-American relations and implied that the renewed attacks on the group should therefore be regarded by the West as an encouraging development.

Along this line, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov told the British ambassador on 7 November that he approved of the interpretation of the party congress given by the Economist of 21 October. This article saw the withdrawal of the deadline on a German treaty as a respite for the West which should be used to probe Soviet intentions and to determine what a solution of the Berlin problem on a "mutually acceptable basis" means in Soviet terminology. The article also pictured Khrushchev as a "man determined to stick to his set course" and the policies and reforms carried out since Stalin's death.

Other Soviet spokesmen have related the congress developments directly to Berlin. A TASS correspondent told a Western official that the West now could expect the USSR to propose new solutions to the Berlin problem in the near future. While Gromyko gave no indication of any changes in the Soviet position, his statement that Smirnov would seek a meeting with Chancellor Adenauer suggests that the Soviets are undertaking a more active diplomatic effort to gain Western agreement to begin negotiations or to continue the exploratory talks begun in New York and Washington. When Smirnov met with Adenauer on 16 August, he maintained that the Soviet Union desired a negotiated settlement on Berlin and would consider any proposals. Adenauer indicated he would continue the discussion after the

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25X1 [ West German elections. Gromyko said, however, that Smirnov, in renewing his discussions with Adenauer, would definitely not be carrying an invitation for him to visit Moscow. ]

25X1 [ Gromyko brought up the question of civilian access to Berlin, distinguishing it from military access and claiming that it was not covered by an agreement. He asserted that Bonn had already accepted East German control of West German civilian traffic to Berlin. This line, together with the overtures for conversations with the new Adenauer government, suggests that Moscow will reiterate its earlier view that the West Germans should take the initiative with proposals in order to protect their interests in Berlin. ]

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### Laotian Developments

Since his audience with King Savang, Souvanna Phouma has several times proposed a meeting of Boun Oum, Souphannouvong, and himself at his "capital" on the Plaine des Jarres. Boun Oum and General Phoumi have repeatedly rejected these proposals. Recently, however, Boun Oum has stated that he would consider going to Hin Heup.

The major issue to be considered by the princes at such a meeting is the composition of the cabinet. The Hin Heup "formula" called for an eight-member "neutralist" center group to be flanked by two four-member groups representing Vientiane and the Pathet Lao respectively. While accepting this formula in principle, Boun Oum contends that four of the eight "neutralists" should be drawn from outside Souvanna's entourage. Souvanna, for his part, appears to have committed the other seven positions to his Xieng Khouang followers. It is possible, however, that Souvanna would agree to the admission of two or three additional, non - Xieng Khouang members to an expanded center group.

Other thorny problems to be resolved include the distribution of key portfolios within the cabinet, the demobilization and integration of the opposing armed forces, and the scheduling of national elections.

The Chinese Communist warning of 9 November appears to be not so much a threat to walk out of the Geneva conference as an effort to strike a note of urgency on the need to exert pressure on Vientiane to accept rebel terms for a coalition government.

In a conversation on 7 November with the UK ambassador in Moscow, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov emphasized that the Soviet Union wanted a Laotian settlement and had no desire to get involved in commitments in that part of the world. Kuznetsov reiterated the Soviet charge that the main difficulty

in reaching a solution was Vientiane's intransigence in forming a coalition government.

At Geneva, the USSR has come closer to the Western position on the critical points of voting procedure for and investigations by the International Control Commission (ICC). However, the chief Soviet delegate continues to assert that the general guidelines for the ICC's role in Laos will have to be based on an arrangement between it and the Laotian Government.

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French-Algerian Negotiations

25X1 [The Tunisian weekly Afrique Action stated on 8 November, in an editorial reportedly concurred in by the PAG's minister of information Yazid, that secret negotiations now are under way. The editorial alleged that two members of the French team that has previously negotiated with the rebels left Paris for Switzerland earlier in the week, and concluded that "the current effort to finish the war seems more serious" than in former talks at Evian and Lugrin.]

De Gaulle's recent statement that an early solution to the Algerian problem is possible "if no one puts any prior conditions, and we put none" may have reflected his concern that the PAG might demand the release of imprisoned rebel vice premier Ben Bella before any final settlement is achieved. Ben Bella and several thousand other Algerian prisoners in France have been staging a hunger strike since 2 November, and Yazid has publicly called attention to his government's "anxiety" about their physical condition.

In his 8 November speech in Toulon, De Gaulle specifically called on the right-wing extremists to abandon their "unhealthy dreams" of a French Algeria and join the rest of the country in backing his policy. Although such statements are unlikely to placate the OAS, there is some indication that its leaders prefer to postpone decisive action against the government until De Gaulle attempts to implement any agreement negotiated with the rebels. [REDACTED]

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